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THE PATH AWAY FROM THE LAW
Richard A. Posner*
Among the questions that came to mind when I reread Holmes's
famous article for this memorial, two are salient: why it is so famous,
and whether it has anything to say to us or is merely a museum piece.
The first question is easier to answer. The striking aphorisms (such
as, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law"; "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV"; "For the rational study of the law the black-letter
man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the
man of statistics and the master of economics') are part of the answer.
Another part of the answer is just who Holmes is - not who he was
in 1897, a state supreme court judge, but what he was fifty years later
and still is: the preeminent figure in the history of American law. And
there is more to explain the article's fame: the beauty of its prose, the
striking combination of breadth and brevity, and most of all, perhaps,
the root-and-branch attack on formalism - Holmes's most thoroughgoing and memorable; an attack that set the agenda for legal realism
and for postformalist legal thought more generally.
The more difficult question is whether the article speaks to us. (If
it does not, why reprint it in a law review, as distinct from a journal
of legal history, to mark its centenary?) Not all famous law review
articles do. An article in the HarvardLaw Review that has been cited
even more frequently than The Path of the Law - Wechsler's article
on neutral principles' - does not.2 Anyway, a mature science is supposed to forget its founders. Well, law is not a mature science, if it is
a science at all, and I think we can still learn from The Path of the

Law.
From a perspective shaped by the dramatic recent changes in legal
practice and legal thought, we can now see that Holmes's article
mounted an even more radical challenge to accepted thinking about

* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.
I Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. I
(1959). For the citation count, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767 tbl.i (I996). Wechsler's article is in second place, Holmes's

in fifth-but Holmes's was published 62 years earlier. The other three articles that outrank
Holmes are even more recent. See id. The Path of the Law is thus the most cited law review
article published before i959.
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law than he, or at least his audience, could have realized.3 The article
advances what I shall call the "supersession thesis." This is the thesis
that law as Holmes knew it, and as we largely know it still, is merely
a stage in human history. It followed revenge, historically, and it will
be succeeded at some time in the future by forms of social control that
perform the essential functions of law but are not law in a recognizable sense, although they are latent in law, just as law was latent in
revenge.
Law in the recognizable sense, the sense that will eventually be
superseded, is continuous with morality. It enforces a subset of moral
duties that is determined by considerations of feasibility and by the
cost and efficacy of alternative methods for securing compliance. So it
enforces some but not all promises and punishes deliberate and careless injuries but not, for example, failures to be a good Samaritan and
rescue people in danger. Still, law is saturated with moral terms. And
the morality with which it is continuous is Christian or Kantian, and
so gives primacy to intentions and other mental states bearing on culpability, rather than focusing, as the ancient Greeks did, primarily on
results. Law is also traditional - today we would say "path dependent." The judges have a duty to enforce the political settlements
made in the past. A related point is that law is "logical," meaning that
new doctrines can be created only by derivation, whether by deduction, analogy, or interpretation, from existing doctrines.
This traditional conception of law, which is as orthodox today (I
might have been paraphrasing Dworkin's legal theory) as it was a century ago, Holmes seems to have regarded as epiphenomenal, dispensable, obscurantist, and transitory. This is the argument of The Path of
the Law as I see it: People care what the law is because judges have
been empowered to decree the use of overwhelming force, and a prudent person wants to know how to avoid getting in the way of that
force. From this standpoint all that matters is being able to predict
3 One mustn't be fooled by Holmes's old-fashioned appearance and "Boston Brahmin" heritage. He was a futurist, an evolutionist, an iconoclast, and an optimist:
I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a chamber for the winged
thing it never has seen but is to be-that man may have cosmic destinies that he does not
understand.... I was walking homeward on Pennsylvania Avenue near the Treasury, and
as I looked beyond Sherman's Statue to the west the sky was aflame with scarlet and
crimson from the setting sun. But, like the note of downfall in Wagner's opera, below the
sky line there came from little globes the pallid discord of the electric lights. And I
thought to myself the G6tterddmmerung will end, and from those globes clustered like evil
eggs will come the new masters of the sky. It is like the time in which we live. But then I
remembered the faith that I partly have expressed, faith in a universe not measured by our
fears, a universe that has thought and more than thought inside of it, and as I gazed, after
the sunset and above the electric lights there shone the stars.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School

Association of New York (Feb. 15, I913), in

THE ESSENTIAL HOLIES: SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 145, 148 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
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how the judges 'vill rule given a particular set of facts, and this is why
people consult lawyers. Statutes and judicial opinions provide the
materials for the prediction. The predictions of what the courts will
do is really all there is to law. Morality is neither here nor there. A
bad man cares as much about keeping out of the way of state force as
a good man. And because law and morality are frequently discrepant,
the law's use of moral language is a source merely of confusion and it
would be good to banish all such language from the law. For example, while both law and morals use the word "duty" a lot, the legal
duty to keep a promise is merely a prediction that if you don't keep it
you'll have to pay any damages that your promise-breaking imposes
on the promisee. The law doesn't care about intentions or other
mental states. It enforces contracts if the parties signify assent,
whether or not they do assent. And words like "intent" or "negligence"
as used in the criminal law denote degrees of dangerousness, nothing
more. The moral and mentalistic baggage of the law is connected with
the fact that the basis of most legal principles is tradition. This is to
be regretted; the only worthwhile use of history in law is to debunk
outmoded doctrines by showing them to be literally vestigial. Judges
should understand that the only sound basis for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires an economic judgment balancing benefits against costs. If the law submitted to instruction by economics
and the other social sciences, we might find the tort system replaced
by a system of social insurance, and the system of criminal law, which
is based on a belief in deterrence, replaced by a system in which the
methods of scientific criminology would be used to identify and isolate
(or even kill) dangerous people.
Holmes pauses in places to reassure his audience that he is not
being cynical or disrespectful about the law. But, revealingly, the "final title to respect" of the law in his view is not that it is good but
merely that "it exists," which connects up with the invocation of force
with which the article began. The law is merely a system of force,
and the force should be directed with a view to the maximum social
advantage. There is nothing more to law than this but the barnacles.
I think that this brief summary will show that critics of Holmes
are wrong to argue that the prediction theory of law is incomplete or
incoherent because the judges of the highest courts cannot use it to
make their own decisions. They cannot; that is true. But in Holmes's
view as articulated or implied in The Path of the Law, what judges do
is not law in any sense that the legal professional will recognize. What
judges do is sometimes mindless standpattism and sometimes voting
their fears, but sometimes, and ideally, it is weighing costs and benefits, though doubtless with some regard (much emphasized in
Holmes's judicial opinions) for avoiding rapid changes of front that
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would make it difficult for lawyers to predict the outcomes of new
cases.
Was Holmes correct that what we think of as law is just a mask
that may confuse the wearer but that has no social function in modernity? A skin that ought to be stripped away to reveal a policymaking
apparatus that could be improved if only it were recognized for what
it is? That is a large question to which I cannot begin to do justice in
so short a space; but for what it is worth I think that Holmes was
largely but not entirely right. There is a lot of needlessly solemn and
obfuscatory moralistic and traditionary blather in judicial decisionmaking and legal thought generally, and it is extremely helpful in
dealing with legal issues always to try to peel away the conventional
verbiage in which the issues come wrapped and look concretely at the
interests at stake, the purposes of the participants, the policies behind
the precedents, and the consequences of alternative decisions. But
Holmes overlooked two important points. The first is that the more
law conforms to prevalent moral opinions, including the moral opinions of relevant subcultures such as the commercial community, the
easier it is to understand and comply with. The people subject to the
law can avoid coming into conffict with it just by acting the part of
well-socialized members of their community. The second point, which
Holmes could not have understood because it is a lesson of totalitarianism, is that the maintenance of a moral veneer in the law's dealing
with the people subject to it, especially the antisocial people subject to
it, offers a first line of defense against excesses of official violence. It
is not healthy to treat even disgusting criminals as animals, an idea
Holmes toyed with in the The Path of the Law when he said, "If the
typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as
deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake
bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid of. . .

."

Excluding a class of human

beings from the human community can become a habit and spread
from criminals to ne'er-do-wells to the sick and the aged and the mentally disturbed or deficient. ("Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."4) By this route, civilization can unravel.
But it would be wrong to end on a negative note. The Path of the
Law retains a remarkable freshness, brimming with insights that illuminate today's legal system as much as or more than that of the nineteenth century. The evolution that Holmes foresaw is far from
complete, but it is well in train. The growth of bureaucracy in all
phases of law; the rise of economics in law and the broader interdisciplinary transformations of legal sclolarship; the unmasking of legal
pretensions by legal realism and successor movements; increased specialization and use of technology, both auguring the demise of a gen4

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.

200, 207 (1927)

(Holmes, J.).
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eral legal culture; and the movement toward the deregulation of legal
services and the concomitant deprofessionalizing of the practice of law
and the rise of law firms modeled on business corporations - all these
developments can be seen, through the lens supplied by The Path of
the Law, as way stations toward a future that Holmes first glimpsed.
He thought lawyers were in the business of making "prophecies"; his
article is a prophecy, and it is coming true.
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